venky-cdmbrm14/obfuscated-activations-llama32-artifacts
Obfuscated Activations in Llama 3.2 — research artifacts This repository is the curated artifact release for a mechanistic case study of two OAT-style, co-trained Llama 3.2 adapters and their linear probes. It contains attack banks and machine-readable results, not prose analysis, generated plots, notebooks, or duplicate report outputs. Built with Llama. See LICENSE.txt, NOTICE, and the component-specific terms below. Companion model repositories… See the full description on the dataset page: https://huggingface.co/datasets/venky-cdmbrm14/obfuscated-activations-llama32-artifacts.
Obfuscated Activations in Llama 3.2 — research artifacts
This repository is the curated artifact release for a mechanistic case study of two OAT-style, co-trained Llama 3.2 adapters and their linear probes. It contains attack banks and machine-readable results, not prose analysis, generated plots, notebooks, or duplicate report outputs.
Built with Llama. See LICENSE.txt, NOTICE, and the component-specific terms below.
Companion model repositories
Contents
All saved experiment bundles retain their _bundle_metadata.json and _manifest.json files. Original runtime-local paths in metadata are provenance strings and are not expected to resolve on another machine.
Experimental scope
- Models: one fixed 1B adapter/probe artifact and one fixed 3B adapter/probe artifact, both trained with seed 42.
- Main write-side grid: PGD budgets 32, 64, 128, and 256; attack seeds 42, 62, and 82; 20 harmful and 20 benign prompt identities reused across conditions.
- Extended R1 grid: budgets 8–256, the same three attack seeds, and both checkpoints.
- Attack family: per-example prompt-token embedding perturbations under a per-token L2 constraint with epsilon 10.
The values 42, 62, and 82 are attack-optimization seeds, not independent training seeds. The model-size comparison is a two-checkpoint comparison, not a scaling law.
Release sanitation
The public release does not redistribute verbatim source-dataset prompts or target completions because Mechanistic-Anomaly-Detection/llama3-jailbreaks currently declares no license metadata.
In Exp7/8 Parquet files, the columns raw_prompt, target_completion, and grader_model_input were removed. Existing 16-character prompt_hash identifiers were retained; equivalent hashes were added to calibration tables before removing prompt text. Numerical measurements, model-generated responses, grading scores, model/revision identifiers, row order, and experimental identifiers were preserved. Each affected bundle manifest was regenerated to match the released files.
This means released Exp7/8 files are curated public-release copies rather than byte-identical copies of the private source files. The transformation is documented in RELEASE_TRANSFORMATIONS.json and the release-wide checksums are in FILE_MANIFEST.csv.
Important limitations
- One training artifact per model size; attack-seed replication does not establish training-seed replication.
- No matched standard-LoRA, behavior-only adversarial, shuffled-probe, base-model, or warmup-checkpoint training control.
- The 32/64 and 128/256 attack banks cross a hardware/software boundary, and realized perturbation norm rises with budget.
- Interventions replay fixed attacks rather than reoptimizing adaptively after model changes.
- Prompt diversity is 20 harmful and 20 benign identities, repeatedly measured across attack seeds.
- Exp7 reports continuous StrongREJECT scores. No binary jailbreak threshold was configured, so binary jailbreak and stealthy-jailbreak rates are undefined.
- Exp8 random directions are parameter-norm matched but not functionally matched.
- Only read-side R1 is complete. R2–R7 are not represented as completed experiments.
- Stored R1 point estimates are usable, but previously reported confidence intervals require a corrected crossed seed-by-prompt bootstrap; no prose inference report is included here.
Content warning and intended use
Some released model-generated responses describe harmful or illegal behavior because the study evaluates monitor evasion. The files are intended for controlled AI-safety and interpretability research. They should not be used as operational instructions, a deployment-ready safeguard, or evidence that the adapters are safe.
Loading examples
from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download
import pandas as pd
root = snapshot_download(
repo_id="venky-cdmbrm14/obfuscated-activations-llama32-artifacts",
repo_type="dataset",
)
# Then select an individual bundle and load one table:
# df = pd.read_parquet(f"{root}/write_side/.../effects.parquet")PGD banks are stored with Safetensors and include per-bundle metadata describing tensor names and shapes.
Licensing and attribution
- Llama-derived artifacts and outputs remain subject to the Llama 3.2 Community License and Acceptable Use Policy. A copy is included in
LICENSE.txt. - The upstream `Mechanistic-Anomaly-Detection/llama3-jailbreaks` dataset currently declares no license metadata. Its verbatim prompt and target text is not included in this public release.
- No blanket relicensing of third-party material is asserted by the
license: othermetadata value. Users are responsible for complying with all applicable component licenses and terms.
