endomorphosis/Caselaw_Access_Project_JSON

1"{\"id\": \"2157142\", \"name\": \"PEOPLE v. CAGE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Cage\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-05-23\", \"docket_number\": \"Docket No. 30213\", \"first_page\": \"534\", \"last_page\": \"542\", \"citations\": \"83 Mich. App. 534\", \"volume\": \"83\", \"reporter\": \"Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.\", \"court\": \"Michigan Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Michigan\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:24:40.204274+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before: D. E. Holbrook, P. J., and N. J. Kaufman and J. E. McDonald, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"PEOPLE v CAGE\", \"head_matter\": \"PEOPLE v CAGE\\nDocket No. 30213.\\nSubmitted October 13, 1977, at Detroit.\\nDecided May 23, 1978.\\nGary Cage was convicted of armed robbery, Recorder\\u2019s Court of Detroit, James Del Rio, J. Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of his prior conviction for attempted use of a stolen credit card to impeach him when he took the witness stand. Defendant also contends that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. Held:\\n1. The offense of attempted use of a credit card is a \\u201chigh\\u201d misdemeanor and as such may be used for impeachment purposes.\\n2. A defendant must move the trial court for a new trial in order to preserve for appeal the claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.\\nAffirmed.\\nN. J. Kaufman, J., dissented and would hold that the defendant\\u2019s conviction should be reversed because of the prosecution\\u2019s use of the defendant\\u2019s prior misdemeanor conviction to impeach the defendant.\\nOpinion of the Court\\n1. Criminal Law\\u2014Evidence\\u2014Impeachment\\u2014Prior Convictions\\u2014 Misdemeanors\\u2014Attempted Use of Stolen Credit Card.\\nImpeachment of a criminal defendant, who takes the witness stand, by means of a prior conviction of attempting to use a stolen credit card, which is a misdemeanor punishable by a prison term of not more than two years, is not improper because the term \\\"misdemeanor\\u201d in the rule which prohibits the use of prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes is a synonym for violations of municipal ordinances; impeachment should be permissible by use of prior convictions' based on a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, regardless of whether it is dubbed \\\"felony\\u201d or \\\"misdemeanor\\u201d.\\nReferences for Points in Headnotes\\n81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses \\u00a7\\u00a7 569, 571, 581, 582.\\n5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \\u00a7 545 et seq.\\n2. Appeal and Error\\u2014Criminal Law\\u2014Weight of Evidence\\u2014New Trial\\u2014Motions.\\nA defendant may not raise on appeal the issue that his conviction was against the great weight of the evidence where he has not filed a motion for a new trial with the trial court.\\nDissent by N. J. Kaufman, J.\\n3. Criminal Law\\u2014Evidence\\u2014Impeachment\\u2014Prior Convictions\\u2014 Misdemeanors\\u2014Attempted Use of Stolen Credit Card.\\nIt is improper to use a criminal defendant\\u2019s prior misdemeanor convictions to impeach the defendant\\u2019s credibility if he chooses to take the witness stand; therefore, it was improper for a trial court to allow the prosecution to impeach a defendant by introducing evidence of the defendant\\u2019s prior conviction for attempted use of a stolen credit card because that offense is a misdemeanor, not a felony.\\nFrank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Craig L. John, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.\\nSolomon & Stern, for defendant on appeal.\\nBefore: D. E. Holbrook, P. J., and N. J. Kaufman and J. E. McDonald, JJ.\\nCircuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment\", \"word_count\": \"2151\", \"char_count\": \"12883\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nDefendant, charged with armed robbery (MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797), was tried and found guilty by a jury. Following sentence, defendant appeals on grounds that the trial court erred in allowing use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, claiming that one of the prior convictions was for a misdemeanor. Defendant also appeals on the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the great weight of the evidence.\\nThe specific prior conviction in question was that of attempting to use a stolen credit card, punishable by a prison term of not more than 2 years under MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287, as a circuit court, or \\\"high\\\" misdemeanor.\\nIn People v Renno, 392 Mich 45; 219 NW2d 422 (1974), the Supreme Court, in reviewing the question of impeachment by prior convictions, said:\\n\\\"The original legislative purpose behind these statutes is obvious. They were passed to allow persons, historically disqualified at common law from testifying in a case, to testify. A compromise, however, was worked out whereby these disqualified persons could still have their credibility attacked by those prior convictions which formerly had disqualified them from testifying.\\n\\\"Not all crimes at common law disqualified a witness. Only infamous crimes disqualified a witness, and our statutes were originally intended only to allow impeachment by use of that type of criminal conviction.\\n\\\"Our Legislature saw fit to pass these statutes and to confer upon the accused a right he previously did not have at common law, that of testifying on his own behalf. The Legislature also saw fit to limit this right, permitting the defendant's credibility to be attacked in the discretion of the trial court by these prior disqualifying convictions. These statutes were passed to give rights to an accused defendant, not to take rights away from him. Allowing the use of municipal ordinance convictions for impeachment purposes does just that\\u2014it takes away rights the accused formerly had at common law.\\n\\\"We do not hesitate in this case to prohibit the further use of municipal ordinance or misdemeanor convictions used by the prosecution solely for impeachment purposes.\\\" 392 Mich 53, 55.\\nA careful reading of Renno, supra, reveals that the word \\\"felony\\\" is not used or defined in the opinion and that the only time the word \\\"misdemeanor\\\" is used in the entire opinion is in the above quotation. We have no hesitancy in assuming that as used in Renno, supra, \\\"misdemeanor\\\" is meant to be a synonym for violations of municipal ordinances and nothing more.\\nWe find this interpretation to be further buttressed by this language in People v McMillan, 68 Mich App 113, 123; 242 NW2d 518 (1976).\\n\\\"We do not think that, in Michigan, the term 'infamous crime' can necessarily be equated with the term 'felony'. In Attorney General v Montgomery, 275 Mich 504, 513; 267 NW 550 (1936), our Supreme Court defined an infamous crime as follows:\\n\\\" 'Whether a crime is infamous or not is not determined by the nature of the offense (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary [Rawle's 3d Rev] p 1553, 1554), but by the consequences to the individuals by the punishment prescribed for such offense. Butler v Wentworth, 84 Me 25 (24 ATL 456, 17 L.R.A. 764). Crimes subject to infamous punishments are infamous crimes, and the term \\\"infamous crime\\\" means any crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.' (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)\\n\\\"It would then appear that under Montgomery, supra, impeachment should be permissible by use of prior convictions based on a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, regardless of whether it is dubbed 'felony' or 'misdemeanor'.\\\"\\nAnd further at 124-125:\\n\\\"The Legislature has broken misdemeanors into two categories, some punishable by imprisonment in the state prison (see e.g. MCLA 750.414; MSA 28.646) and some punishable by a maximum of 90 days in the county jail, MCLA 750.504; MSA 28.772. We think that it would both be more logical and more in spirit with the holding of Montgomery supra, if the rule of Renno was limited to those crimes carrying a maximum of 90 days in the county jail.\\\" (Emphasis in original.)\\nHad the Supreme Court intended to include high misdemeanors or crimes with sentences greater than one year, it certainly could have, but declined to do so, for leave to appeal McMillan was denied. 399 Mich 825 (1977).\\nThe decision by the trial court in the instant case, to permit impeachment by means of the conviction of attempting to use a stolen credit card, was not error. People v Renno, 392 Mich 45; 219 NW2d 422 (1974), People v McMillan, 68 Mich App 113; 242 NW2d 518 (1976), lv den, 399 Mich 825 (1977).\\nDefendant's claim that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence is not properly before this Court as defendant has not moved for a new trial as is required to preserve the issue for review. People v Mattison, 26 Mich App 453, 459; 182 NW2d 604 (1970), People v Towns, 69 Mich App 475, 476; 245 NW2d 97 (1976).\\nAffirmed.\\nSupporting the above interpretation of Renno, MRE 609 continues the avoidance of the felony-misdemeanor morass. See Robinson, James K., and John W. Reed, A Review of the Proposed Michigan Rules of Evidence, 56 Michigan State Bar Journal 21, 30 (January, 1977).\"}"